Battle of Stalingrad


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The Battle of Stalingrad (1942-43) was a major turning point in World War
II. While not Germany's first setback, it was one of the most important, and
one from which it never fully recovered.

Background

The first major military setback for the Third Reich occurred on the
outskirts of Moscow at the end of 1941. Left in poor defensive positions,
the Soviet Union counter-attacked and drove the Germans back. The reasons
for the scale of the defeat included the Germans' lack of preparation for
the harshness of the Russian winter, the overextension of their supply lines
across their newly-captured areas, and Hitler's unwillingness to consider retreat.

As the winter continued the situation for the Germans improved as more
attention was put on equipping them. Meanwhile newly formed units were being
sent forward from Germany, and by the early spring the army should be back
in fighting condition. Everyone, the Soviets included, expected them to
launch a summer offensive with another massive attack towards Moscow by the
German Army Group Center.

However the German generals were aware of their weakness after the losses in
front of Moscow, and demanded a more modest offensive. The Oberkommando der
Wehrmacht (OKW) developed a plan involving Army Group South in an attack
into the Caucasus, cutting Russia in two and capturing the majority of
Soviet oil fields and grain producing regions. This sort of surprise attack
over great distances was the hallmark of the Blitzkrieg attack, which sought
to avoid direct battle by attacking where least expected and then advancing
as fast as possible so the enemy had no chance to plan a defence.

Operation Blue

Their plan, Operation Blue, split Army Group South into two groups. Army
Group A consisted of two armies, commanded by Erich von Manstein and von
Kleist, who were to attack south towards Rostov, and then fan out through
the Transcaucasus heading for the Caspian Sea while taking the oil-fields at
Maikop. Army Group B included Friedrich von Paulus's 6th Army and Hoth's 4th
Panzer Army, who would sweep through the corridor between the Don and Volga
rivers to arrive on the Volga just north of Stalingrad (known today as
Volgograd). Their primary task was to provide a strong northern flank along
the Don, while cutting the vital Soviet freight traffic on the Volga.

While the plans were finalized, there was the little detail of the lingering
Soviet presence at Sevastopol in the Crimean. The siege of this important
city had been dragging on for four months at this point, but the Soviets
still had 150,000 men in and around the city. Eventually Operation Blue was
suspended to provide more troops for the siege, and the original launch date
in May was cancelled. Manstein was sent south with a number of fresh German
and Romanian units under Operation Sturgeon, forming up for action by early
June. By the end of the month the siege was over, the Soviets losing all
150,000, but the German/Romanian side having suffered 35,000 casualties as
well. The battle was largely over by the 25th, and Operation Blue was released.

Commencing on June 28, 1942, the attack started off well. So well in fact
that Hitler felt that the 4th Panzer Army was not needed with Army Group B,
and sent them south to join Army Group A. By this point they had passed the
6th Army (as was expected, they were motorized) and had to cross the 6th's
path of march on their way south. The resulting traffic jam took several
days to clear. This confusion, along with provisions originally intended for
the 6th being given to the 4th instead, slowed the advance towards
Stalingrad by almost two weeks. With the advance now delayed, Hitler then
changed his mind again and ordered the 4th to rejoin the original line of march.

This delay would prove critical. The slow advance made the target of Army
Group B clear to the Soviets, and gave Red Army General Andrei Yeremenko
time to consolidate what forces he had into a new line on the eastern bank
of the Volga to block them. He ordered the troops reeling back from the
Germans on the western side to head for Stalingrad, leaving the field to the
Germans. This did not go unnoticed, as von Weichs, in overall command of
Army Group B, realised that the Soviets had figured out what was going on.
Hitler instead chose to consider the same reports as proof of absolute victory.

By the end of August Army Group B had finally reached the Volga to the north
of Stalingrad, before many of the Red Army troops to their south had.
General von Paulus asked for permission to turn south and take the city as
soon as possible, but Hitler refused to allow this until his infantry had
caught up to form a defensive line. This delay would also prove critical, as
it allowed the Soviet forces to pour into the city over the next few days,
strengthening its defences.

Rattenkrieg

Units of the Red Army in Stalingrad were quickly organized into the new 62nd
Army, under the command of General Lopatin. When Lopatin expressed his fears
about the upcoming battle, Yeremenko immediately replaced him with Vasily
Ivanovich Chuikov, who had previously fought around Stalingrad against the
White Army. Yeremenko directed Chuikov to hold the city at all costs, and
issued an order similar to Stalin's own, "Not another step back".
Countersigned by Nikita Krushchev, this order was backed up with
instructions for the NKVD to shoot anyone who failed to comply.

By September 1st Stalingrad was completely surrounded by the German 6th
Army. Chuikov refused to meet the Germans outside the city, and had instead
set up a huge number of strongpoints in the houses and factories inside. The
Germans found themselves facing dug-in troops, and the battle quickly
developed into what the Germans referred to as Rattenkrieg, rat-war. With
both sides promoting a no-retreat, no-surrender policy, intense street
fighting ensued — often descending into hand-to-hand bayonet struggles
— and parts of the city changed hands as many as three or four times a
day.

German tactics during the battle increasingly relied on air power to block
re-enforcements being sent in from the east side of the river. A running
battle started between the Luftwaffe and the VVS and Soviet anti-aircraft
guns. Although German losses were high, they won control of the river. The
re-enforcement operations simply switched to moving during the night,
thereby eliminating the air threat.

Meanwhile attempts were made to start the ground fight moving with
increasingly heavy artillery barrages, eventually culminating in the
delivery of several gigantic 600mm German mortars. As time would prove,
however, the Soviets were quick to take up positions in the resulting rubble.

Although losses were heavy, the 6th Army slowly pushed the 62nd back to the
Volga. Eventually the Soviet forces were split in two and Chuikov lost
communications with the other half. After another two weeks the 62nd Army
consisted of less than a division's worth of men in a small sliver of land
on the southern end of town, but continued to fight on as hard as ever. The
strain on both commanders was immense: von Paulus developed an
uncontrollable tic in his eye, while Chuikov was experiencing an outbreak of
eczema that required him to bandage his hands completely.

In Berlin, the situation frustrated Hitler. He became increasingly convinced
that the battle in the city represented the end of the war itself, and the
ability to claim that they had captured "Stalin's City" was a victory worth
more than the original battle plan. With grave concerns over the exposed
left flank, Franz Halder, chief of the OKW, continued to express his
misgivings to Hitler. In mid-October 1942, with no immediate end to the
battle in sight, Halder and Hitler quarrelled for the last time. Hitler
dismissed Halder, replacing him with the more tractable General Kurt Zeitzler.

Meanwhile the rest of the line was being ignored. While the possibility of a
counterattack along the long northern flank on the Don had been discussed on
several occasions, Hitler's increasingly irrational orders meant no
defensive work could be carried out. On one particular stretch the line did
not actually run on the Don, leaving the Red Army several beachheads
directly in front of the Romanian 3rd Army. The 3rd had proven itself in
combat at Sevastopol that summer, but were now stretched out along 150 km of
the front after taking over from German and Italian units. The Romanian
commander had asked for tanks to clear out the pocket on several occasions,
but in vain. His requests for bulldozers to cut through the frozen ground
and make defensive works were also refused.

In early November Luftwaffe reconnaissance flights started showing a massive
buildup of Red Army units just north of the Romanian 3rd Army, preparing for
an offensive on the beachhead. Increasingly desperate messages dispatched to
the OKW from the 6th Army HQ were ignored, or returned with admonishment
about getting on with the task at hand. von Paulus eventually gave up asking
and moved the 22nd Panzer Division into position south of the Romanians.
However they arrived in terrible condition with only 50 serviceable tanks,
but were nevertheless formed up with the only Romanian tank division to form
the newly-named 48th Armoured Corps.

Operation Uranus

On November 19, 1942 the Red Army unleashed Operation Uranus. General
Vatutin's attacking units consisted of three complete armies, the 1st Guard,
5th Tank and 21st Army, including a total of 18 infantry divisions, eight
tank brigades, two motorised brigades, six cavalry divisions and one
antitank brigade. The vast majority of these units were sent against two
points in the Romanian lines.

The Romanian troops conducted an almost miraculous defence and managed to
hold the line for one day. The situation was hopeless however, they were
outnumbered some 3 to 1 (almost 7 to 1 in tanks), and had little modern
equipment to face the fresh units being sent in against them. On the 20th
their line had been breached and huge numbers of Red Army divisions started
streaming south.

Also on the 20th a second attack was launched to the south of the city
against points held by the Romanian 4th Army, made up primarily of cavalry,
and this army collapsed almost immediately. The Soviet attackers met in a
pincer movement near Kalach two days later, trapping 300,000 Wehrmacht
soldiers of the 6th Army and about half of the 4th Panzer Army in and around
Stalingrad, and shattering both Romanian armies in the process.

Hermann Gšring promised that all the necessary supplies for the 6th Army
could be delivered by the Luftwaffe. This would allow them to fight on while
a ground force was assembled to re-open the line. If this worked, the tables
could be turned, with the Red Army units on the "far side" of the Don
suddenly surrounded by troops in the city and newly arriving units from the
west. This strategy had been used to great effect the year before, but on a
much smaller scale and during the summer. Supplying the 6th Army would
require 300 tonnes to be delivered each day, and by any count the number of
planes needed to achieve this was clearly not available. However the claim,
once stated, could not be withdrawn, and Adolf Hitler backed Gšring's plan
and re-iterated his order of "no surrender" to his trapped armies.

The supply mission failed almost immediately. The winter weather offered few
occasions when the planes could be flown in, with one or both ends of the
flight-path covered in clouds and snow. On days with good weather about 280
tonnes would arrive, but there were only two of these over the next two
months. In general only 1/10th of the needed supplies were able to be
delivered. The supply planes evacuated sick and wounded Sixth Army soldiers
when taking off from the besieged enclave.

By this point the Red Army had had enough time to set up defences of their
own, so any hope of a forced breakout by the 6th Army was now futile.
Meanwhile the forces that had not been trapped were desperately setting up a
defensive line along the Don and Chir rivers about 40 miles to the west of
the city, organised into the new Army Group Don with von Manstein in
command. Although they were under constant attack by various Red Army units,
the Soviets did not exploit this opportunity and focused entirely on taking
the city.

By early December 1942 a battlegroup had been formed up southwest of the
city from troops withdrawn from the Caucasus. Although these were excellent
troops with an excellent commander, by this point they were tired and badly
in need of rest and refit. Moreover the majority of the troops in the
Caucasus were left where they were in order to guard their hard-won advances
in the months prior. Facing this newly-reinforced 4th Panzer Army was the
2nd Guards Army, one of the Soviet Union's better units. On 12 December 1942
the Panzers launched their attack towards Stalingrad, but the attack ran out
of momentum and stalled some 25 kilometers from the city and was called off
on the 23rd. At this point any hope of rescue was dashed.

Operation Neptune

In January the Red Army launched Operation Neptune, another massive attack
from the nothern flank, this time against the Italian 8th Army located just
to the west of the former Romanian positions. Their aim this time was to
drive to Rostov on the Black Sea, thereby cutting off all of Army Group South.

Hitler continued to make repeated "no retreat" demands to the troops, and
von Manstein grew so tired of these he eventually demanded to either be left
alone or replaced. Hitler relented, and von Manstein started a mobile
defence using Panzers as "fire brigades" that would be ordered into holes in
the line. The defence was considerably more successful than might have been
expected given the state of the troops, and the Red Army was unable to get
anywhere near Rostov. Nevertheless their advance did drive the German lines
back further, and now Stalingrad was some 250 km away.

The Battle Ends

Realizing all hope was lost, Friedrich von Paulus, in command of what
remained of the 6th Army, started forming plans for surrender. Realising
this, and hoping to rescue something of the battle, Hitler promoted him to
Field-Marshal on January 30th, 1943. No German Field-Marshal had ever been
taken alive in war, and it was hoped this would force him to fight on, or
take his own life.

Instead von Paulus saw this as yet another example of Hitler's increasing
irrationality. On January 31, 1943 von Paulus ordered the 6th Army to
surrender on February 2. A force of 300,000 was now reduced to only 91,000
tired and starved men. The Soviets force-marched them to detention camps,
many dying of starvation on the way. Only some 5,000 would return to Germany
after the end of the war.

By any measure the battle of Stalingrad was one of the bloodiest battles in
modern history, with some 300,000 Germans killed or captured. Soviet battle
deaths were at least 400,000, possibly much higher, with more than 100,000
civilians killed in Stalingrad and its suburbs. No accurate figures have
been given for the numbers of Italian and Romanian soldiers killed in the battle.

The historian William L. Shirer, in his history of World War II, The Rise
and Fall of the Third Reich, summarised the importance of the Battle of
Stalingrad with these words:

Coupled with El Alamein and the British-American landings in North Africa it
marked the great turning point in World War II. The high tide of Nazi
conquest which had rolled over most of Europe to the frontier of Asia on the
Volga and in Africa almost to the Nile had now begun to ebb and it would
never flow back again. The time of the great Nazi blitz offensives, with
thousands of tanks and planes spreading terror in the ranks of the enemy
armies and cutting them to pieces, had come to an end.