Battle of the Coral Sea





The Battle of
the Coral Sea,                    Battle of the Coral Sea
in early May    Date of battle May 4 - May 8, 1942
1942, was the   Conflict       Second World War
first major
aircraft        Battle before  The Doolittle Raid
carrier         Battle after   Battle of Midway
engagement of
the Second      Site of battle Coral Sea, between Australia,
                               New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands
World War, and
one of the      Combatant 1    USA and Australia
half-dozen most Commanders     Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher
significant
battles of the  Strength       2 large carriers, 3 cruisers
Pacific war. It Combatant 2    Japan
was also the    Commanders     Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue
first naval
battle to take  Strength       2 large carriers, 1 small carrier, 4 cruisers
place at long
distance:       Result         Tactical Japanese victory,
                               strategic Allied victory
neither side's
surface fleet   Casualties     (1): 540
sighted the                    (2): 3,500
other.

Background

Having conquered nearly all of Southeast Asia in just a few months, Japan
was at the apex of its power. Still reeling from a long series of
humiliating defeats, the Allies were just beginning to develop the skills
and organise the materiel assets needed to survive and, eventually, strike
back. Allied strategy at this time was focused on a defensive build-up of
United States Army and Marine strength on New Caledonia (well to the south
of the Solomon Islands), and Australian air and ground strength at Port
Moresby (in southern New Guinea, just north of the Australian mainland).

In April 1942, Japanese forces left their stronghold of Rabaul (on New
Britain, just north of New Guinea) and launched a two-pronged amphibious
invasion of Port Moresby (Operation MO), and Tulagi in the Solomon Islands.
The intention was threefold: to establish control of the Solomons, initially
with a seaplane base; to destroy and then occupy Port Morseby (the last
Allied base between Japan and Australia); and in doing these things, to
bring the American aircraft carrier fleet to battle for the first time in
the war. Historians remain divided about Japanese longer-term intentions:
there seems little doubt that they planned to greatly strengthen their hold
on the Solomon Islands as a bastion against any future US counter attacks, a
reasonable probability that northern Australia would be invaded, and
considerable doubt about the following moves, if any. In practice, Japanese
military planning structure was complex, had ill-defined areas of
responsibility, and was crippled by endless bitter debates between army and
navy. The only firm deduction that can be made about longer-term Japanese
plans in the South Pacific is that whatever the navy eventually put forward
would be opposed by the army with a counter-plan!

Three Japanese fleets set sail: the invasion forces for the Solomons and
Port Moresby, and a covering force consisting of two big new aircraft
carriers (Shokaku and Zuikaku, both Pearl Harbor veterans), a smaller
carrier (Shoho), two heavy cruisers, and supporting craft. Alerted by radio
intercepts, the Allies knew that Japanese land-based aircraft were being
moved south and that an operation was impending. In opposition, they had
three main fleets: USS Yorktown (CV-5) already in the Coral Sea under the
command of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, USS Lexington (CV-2) en route, and a
joint Allied surface fleet. The carriers USS Hornet (CV-8) and USS
Enterprise (CV-6) were heading south after the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo but
arrived too late to take part in the battle.

The battle

Lexington arrived to join Yorktown on May 1st. The Japanese occupied Tulagi
without incident on May 3rd, and construction of a seaplane base started.
After fuelling, Yorktown closed on Tulagi and, on May 4, launched three
successful strikes against Japanese shipping and aircraft there - revealing
the presence of an American carrier to the enemy but sinking the destroyer
Mikazuki, crippling the island's floatplane reconnaissance capability, and
damaging other vessels before retiring to the south to rendezvous with
Lexington and the newly-arrived cruisers. Meanwhile, the two large Japanese
carriers were approaching from south of the Solomons - neatly placing the
Allied fleet between the two Japanese fleets.

Land-based B-17s attacked the gradually approaching Port Moresby invasion
fleet on May 6 with the usual lack of success. (Almost another year would
pass before air forces realised that high-level bombing raids on moving
naval targets were pointless.) Although both carrier fleets flew extensive
searches on the 6th, cloudy weather kept them hidden from each other and the
two fleets spent the night only 70 miles apart.

On the 7th, both fleets flew off all available aircraft, but neither found
the main body of the other, and both mistakenly attacked subsidiary forces.
Japanese aircraft found the US fleet oiler USS Neosho (AO-23) and escorting
destroyer USS Sims (DD-409); mistaking them for a carrier and a cruiser,
they attacked and sank both. Meanwhile, the US aircraft had missed Shokaku
and Zuikaku but found the invasion fleet, in company with the small carrier
Shoho, which was soon sunk. In the previous five months, the Allies had lost
a dozen battleships and carriers and been unable to sink a single major
Japanese unit in return. Shoho was small by carrier standards, but the
laconic "scratch one flattop" radioed back to Lexington brought news of the
first Allied naval success of the Pacific war.

That night Fletcher, mindful that his primary role was to protect Port
Moresby, took the tough decision to detach his surface fleet (cruisers HMAS
Australia, USS Chicago (CA-29), HMAS Hobart, and two American destroyers) to
block the progress of the invasion fleet toward Port Moresby, knowing that
exposing surface ships to attack by land-based aircraft without air cover
was to risk the same fate that had overtaken British battleships HMS Prince
of Wales and HMS Repulse five months before.

Finally, with dawn searches on May 8, the main carrier forces located one
another and launched maximum effort raids, which passed each other in the
air. Hidden by rain, Zuikaku escaped detection, but Shokaku was hit three
times by bombs. Listing and on fire, Shokaku was unable to land her aircraft
and effectively out of action.

Both American carriers were hit by the Japanese strike: Yorktown by a bomb,
the larger, less manoeuvrable Lexington by both bombs and torpedoes.
Although she survived the immediate damage and was thought to be repairable,
leaking aviation fuel exploded a little over an hour later: Lexington had to
be abandoned and torpedoed to prevent capture.

While the carrier task forces were battling, the Allied surface force had
approached within range of land-based aircraft from Rabaul. It was attacked
repeatedly through the day by Japanese bombers and once (mistakenly) by
American B-17s, but survived intact and continued to stand between the
invasion force and Port Moresby. Misled as to the strength of the surface
force by returning fliers' reports, Japanese Admiral Inouye (in overall
command of the operation from Rabaul) ordered the invasion fleet to return.
With Shokaku damaged and Zuikaku short on aircraft, neither was able to take
part in the crucial Battle of Midway a month later. Yorktown returned to
Pearl Harbor.

Significance

   * In tactical terms, the Japanese had had a narrow victory: one small
     carrier lost and a large carrier damaged, against the loss of a large
     carrier and equivalent damage to another. But from the Allied point of
     view, after five months of continuous defeat, a battle that came out
     almost even was close enough to a victory as not to matter.
   * The seabourne invasion of Port Moresby was averted. Moresby was vital
     to Allied strategy, and could not have been defended by the ground
     forces then stationed there. The loss of Port Moresby may well have
     meant the loss of Australia, and would certainly have been a dreadful
     blow to the Allied cause. Without a toehold in New Guinea, the
     subsequent Allied advance, difficult though it was, would have been
     much harder still. As a result of the Coral Sea battle, the Japanese
     were forced to attempt taking Moresby overland. The consequent delay
     was just long enough to permit the arrival of veteran AIF soldiers to
     fight the Kokoda Track campaign, which in turn relieved pressure on
     Guadalcanal.
   * The US Navy learned a great deal from the Battle of the Coral Sea. From
     the loss of Lexington the Navy learned better ways to contain aviation
     fuel and control defensive fighter aircraft, from the attacks on the
     Japanese carriers it learned more about coordination of dive-bombers
     and torpedo bombers to best effect (too late to help with Midway, but
     of value longer-term), and, perhaps most importantly of all, it learned
     that the Japanese could perhaps be beaten.
   * The loss of Lexington was a severe blow, but in time the US was able to
     replace ship, aircraft, and pilots with others superior in all
     respects.
   * The damage to Yorktown was estimated to require months in port, but in
     a miracle of improvisation she was made more-or-less battleworthy after
     just three days in Pearl, and was then able to play a vital part in the
     most important battle of the Pacific war: Midway.
   * Although Zuikaku was only slightly damaged, with only 40 aircraft left
     she was in no condition to fight and had to return to Japan to
     replenish. Shokaku took six months to repair. Neither carrier was able
     to take part in the crucial battle of Midway - a very close-fought
     encounter that either carrier may have been able to turn.
   * Less directly but no less significantly, the loss of highly trained
     aircrew from the carriers was never to be made up. Prior to the battles
     of the Coral Sea and (even more so) Midway, Japanese naval aviation was
     unchallengeable in two oceans. Long years of hard peace-time training,
     and real-life exercises against the hapless Chinese (and the scarcely
     less hapless western Allies) had honed an elite group of flyers. Japan
     could manufacture plenty of replacement aircraft, and at least a few
     replacement carriers, but could not replace the most skilled naval
     pilots in the world. From this time on, Japanese naval aviation began
     to decline.